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Description

Part of my ongoing Shadow of Damascus timeline, other maps for which can be found here:
www.deviantart.com/fdrizel/art… The Second Palestine War 1960-61
www.deviantart.com/fdrizel/art… Jordan following the Damascus Accords of 1952

The end of the Second Palestine war brought a period of relative stability for both Egypt and Syria in their foreign policy, with the consolidation of the two allies’ control over what had been Palestine serving to boost their standing both against their regional foes, notably Jordan, and in the wider Middle East as a whole. In spite of this, the two still faced considerable challenges to their positions, both internally and externally. A thorn in the domestic policies of both nations had, since 1948, been ongoing resistance to their rule, particularly from Palestinians discontent with being governed from Cairo or Damascus. Acts of terrorism and sabotage gradually increased in frequency and severity throughout the 50s and 60s, often leading to the deaths of military personnel and, particularly in the case of Syria following a late 1961 bomb attack, the imposition of harsh police crackdowns and even martial law. Both had tried to alleviate frustrations among Palestinians right from 1948 with the establishment of semi-autonomous governorates, though the already limited power of these bodies was only further reduced as politicians in both Egypt and Syria viewed Palestinians with increasing suspicion. Syria’s position was made more strenuous with its ongoing military occupation of Lebanon since 1960, in the hopes of integrating the area as Syria’s 15th governorate, only to meet more resistance from the local populace, particularly in the form of armed resistance from Lebanese Christian groups (such as the notorious Maronite Freedom Organisation).

Pro-Arab Nationalist and Arab Socialist sentiment skyrocketed in Syria following the March 1962 nationalisation of the Suez Canal by President Mohieddin of Egypt, a key advocate of the aforementioned ideologies himself, which appeared to many Syrians as a defiant stand towards the old imperial powers of France and Britain especially in the wake of what appeared to be a comparatively weak response by the British, an economic embargo and the temporary cessation of diplomatic relations with Cairo. It was partly the euphoria generated by this apparent ‘victory for the Arab cause’ that spurred the electoral victory of Afif al-Bizri in May 1962, a popular Syrian general standing for the National Party, who was known to have his own socialist leanings. There had existed a fear in the CIA that the election of Al-Bizri would mean greater cooperation between Syria and the USSR, something that had already been observed under Al-Bizri’s more conservative predecessor, Shukri al-Quwatli. A CIA coup attempt to bring elements of the military to power in Syria just a month after Al-Bizri’s inauguration had the potential to topple the President, but a counter-coup effort led by Syrian intelligence, and with the support of Egyptian troops (though the Egyptian troops were primarily deployed to Damascus in a symbolic capacity) foiled the coup, and served to both increase Al-Bizri’s domestic popularity, and to significantly bolster relations between Mohieddin’s and Al-Bizri’s governments.

With the newly strengthened alliance between Egypt and Syria, the two entered into an official mutual defence pact, signed in Alexandria, in September. This was intended as a means of combatting both external threats, notably in the form of their shared enemies in Jordan, Iraq and, more recently, Saudi Arabia, as well as tackling mutual domestic difficulties through joining their resources against Palestinian insurgencies and attempting to restore order to the region. In the wake of the signing of the pact, calls for unity between the two nations became increasingly prominent, and may have been encouraged covertly by the Soviet Union, seeking a powerful sympathetic nation in the Middle East to benefit its own interests. The winter of 1962-63 would see the advancement of this cause, as negotiations began for the creation of a unified Egyptian and Syrian state, intended as an initial step towards the realisation of the broader pan-Arab vision. As these talks were finalised and the constitution of the ‘United Arab Federation’ was signed in Cairo on the 11th of February 1963, Mohieddin and Al-Bizri emerged to cheering crowds, a moment recorded by many news agencies globally. The Union was to be structured along a federal system, with autonomy granted to both Syria and Egypt, and the central government to sit alternatively throughout the year in both Damascus and Cairo so as to avoid the domination of the Union by one involved party, though Al-Bizri conceded that the Union’s first President be Mohieddin himself.

The initial years of the UAF were relatively prosperous for the involved nations, seeing increased financial backing from their ally in the USSR as well as their own joint independent economic progress bringing growth. The initial stability that followed the UAF’s creation was furthered nearly a year after its creation with the conclusion of the Jerusalem Accords in December 1963. The Accords calmed tensions and violence in Palestine for a time, through conjoining the autonomous Palestinian governments in Egypt and Syria into a single Palestine Civil Authority with expanded domestic powers, including an independent police force and a devolved legislature with some autonomous governing powers over Palestine. However, the UAF was to meet a serious test to its viability when, in mid-1965, a coalition of Iraqi nationalists, republicans and officers in the military seized Baghdad, demanding Faisal II’s abdication and the abolishment of the Hashemite monarchy in the country. In the wake of the ‘revolution’, Faisal fled with his family to Basrah, seeking to rally support from other Middle Eastern countries and the West to restore him to his throne, despite his visible unpopularity among much of the Iraqi population. At meetings in London, British and American diplomats came to a general consensus that, should the monarchy in Iraq fall, a void would be left for unchecked influence from both the UAF and the Soviet Union to fill, generating an inherent threat to stability in the region and the interests of either power. These fears were exacerbated when several high-ranking politicians and generals allied to the revolution declared their support for the UAF, an act viewed in the eyes of many in the West as tantamount to declaring support for Arab Socialism and the USSR. By the end of July, American economic support was being sent to both Faisal and his small detachment of loyal troops, as well as to Saudi Arabia, a nation which seemed poised to enter into any conflict on Faisal’s side. At Faisal’s request, both the United States and the United Kingdom sent military advisers and equipment to his forces, as well as supporting a large recruitment drive in southern Iraq to bolster the loyalist troops (though, wary of his reputation as a ‘western puppet’, Faisal stopped short of requesting American or British troops to become directly involved). The stage seemed set for civil war in Iraq, an event with the potential to create a new front for the Cold War.

Iraq’s civil war was to last for years to come, as Faisal’s forces, with considerable support especially from Saudi Arabia, seeing initial successes in pushing up the Euphrates and Tigris rivers towards Baghdad. The UAF too had found itself involved in the conflict, as it sent troop detachments to the Revolutionary forces based out of Baghdad, though this was to have a taxing effect on the internal stability of the Union, as its troops suffered high casualty rates and saw little success between 1965 and 1968. Increased political and economic support from the Soviet Union for the Revolutionaries, as well as the development of a deadly stalemate south of Baghdad by early 1965, led to the increase in the prominence of leftist factions in the Revolutionary army as its rhetoric shifted towards a broader anti-monarchical and anti-western stance. As Fuad al-Rikabi, a self-declared socialist, came to lead the forces of the revolution that same year, it appeared to many that the conflict had turned into a direct fight against socialism on the part of the western powers. The withdrawal of much of the United States’ economic support in late 1968 in response to the continued stalemate was a severe blow to the integrity of Faisal’s war effort. In the next three years, his forces would be gradually driven back to the sea, until, in January 1971, Faisal fled following the capture of Basrah and the capitulation of most of his forces. The fall of Basrah brought and end to the six year-long devastating Iraqi civil war, and though it ended in victory for the Revolutionaries and socialists, its effects were heavily detrimental to the neighbouring UAF, which had poured millions of dollars and thousands of troops into the conflict.

The UAF’s blunder in Iraq, which generated considerable domestic grievances, combined with the resignation of Khaled Mohieddin after what has been described as an ‘internal party coup’, left the Union’s future uncertain. Finally, after growing public discontent with the current political arrangement in the UAF, particularly in Syria where, despite efforts to prevent it, many felt there was undeniable Egyptian domination over the internal workings of the Union, the Presidents of Egypt and Syria signed the ‘July Reforms’ of 1971, which formally dissolved the UAF in favour of a return to a simple economic and military alliance, renamed the Association of Arab Republics. With the end of an attempted venture in realising pan-Arabism, Egypt and Syria would gradually drift further apart in their foreign and domestic policies, though Egypt, at least for a time, would continue to pursue a goal of advancing the cause of Arab-nationalism, notably in its intervention in South Yemen from 1971 onwards.

Description

Part of my ongoing Shadow of Damascus timeline, other maps for which can be found here:
www.deviantart.com/fdrizel/art… The Second Palestine War 1960-61
www.deviantart.com/fdrizel/art… Jordan following the Damascus Accords of 1952

The end of the Second Palestine war brought a period of relative stability for both Egypt and Syria in their foreign policy, with the consolidation of the two allies’ control over what had been Palestine serving to boost their standing both against their regional foes, notably Jordan, and in the wider Middle East as a whole. In spite of this, the two still faced considerable challenges to their positions, both internally and externally. A thorn in the domestic policies of both nations had, since 1948, been ongoing resistance to their rule, particularly from Palestinians discontent with being governed from Cairo or Damascus. Acts of terrorism and sabotage gradually increased in frequency and severity throughout the 50s and 60s, often leading to the deaths of military personnel and, particularly in the case of Syria following a late 1961 bomb attack, the imposition of harsh police crackdowns and even martial law. Both had tried to alleviate frustrations among Palestinians right from 1948 with the establishment of semi-autonomous governorates, though the already limited power of these bodies was only further reduced as politicians in both Egypt and Syria viewed Palestinians with increasing suspicion. Syria’s position was made more strenuous with its ongoing military occupation of Lebanon since 1960, in the hopes of integrating the area as Syria’s 15th governorate, only to meet more resistance from the local populace, particularly in the form of armed resistance from Lebanese Christian groups (such as the notorious Maronite Freedom Organisation).

Pro-Arab Nationalist and Arab Socialist sentiment skyrocketed in Syria following the March 1962 nationalisation of the Suez Canal by President Mohieddin of Egypt, a key advocate of the aforementioned ideologies himself, which appeared to many Syrians as a defiant stand towards the old imperial powers of France and Britain especially in the wake of what appeared to be a comparatively weak response by the British, an economic embargo and the temporary cessation of diplomatic relations with Cairo. It was partly the euphoria generated by this apparent ‘victory for the Arab cause’ that spurred the electoral victory of Afif al-Bizri in May 1962, a popular Syrian general standing for the National Party, who was known to have his own socialist leanings. There had existed a fear in the CIA that the election of Al-Bizri would mean greater cooperation between Syria and the USSR, something that had already been observed under Al-Bizri’s more conservative predecessor, Shukri al-Quwatli. A CIA coup attempt to bring elements of the military to power in Syria just a month after Al-Bizri’s inauguration had the potential to topple the President, but a counter-coup effort led by Syrian intelligence, and with the support of Egyptian troops (though the Egyptian troops were primarily deployed to Damascus in a symbolic capacity) foiled the coup, and served to both increase Al-Bizri’s domestic popularity, and to significantly bolster relations between Mohieddin’s and Al-Bizri’s governments.

With the newly strengthened alliance between Egypt and Syria, the two entered into an official mutual defence pact, signed in Alexandria, in September. This was intended as a means of combatting both external threats, notably in the form of their shared enemies in Jordan, Iraq and, more recently, Saudi Arabia, as well as tackling mutual domestic difficulties through joining their resources against Palestinian insurgencies and attempting to restore order to the region. In the wake of the signing of the pact, calls for unity between the two nations became increasingly prominent, and may have been encouraged covertly by the Soviet Union, seeking a powerful sympathetic nation in the Middle East to benefit its own interests. The winter of 1962-63 would see the advancement of this cause, as negotiations began for the creation of a unified Egyptian and Syrian state, intended as an initial step towards the realisation of the broader pan-Arab vision. As these talks were finalised and the constitution of the ‘United Arab Federation’ was signed in Cairo on the 11th of February 1963, Mohieddin and Al-Bizri emerged to cheering crowds, a moment recorded by many news agencies globally. The Union was to be structured along a federal system, with autonomy granted to both Syria and Egypt, and the central government to sit alternatively throughout the year in both Damascus and Cairo so as to avoid the domination of the Union by one involved party, though Al-Bizri conceded that the Union’s first President be Mohieddin himself.

The initial years of the UAF were relatively prosperous for the involved nations, seeing increased financial backing from their ally in the USSR as well as their own joint independent economic progress bringing growth. The initial stability that followed the UAF’s creation was furthered nearly a year after its creation with the conclusion of the Jerusalem Accords in December 1963. The Accords calmed tensions and violence in Palestine for a time, through conjoining the autonomous Palestinian governments in Egypt and Syria into a single Palestine Civil Authority with expanded domestic powers, including an independent police force and a devolved legislature with some autonomous governing powers over Palestine. However, the UAF was to meet a serious test to its viability when, in mid-1965, a coalition of Iraqi nationalists, republicans and officers in the military seized Baghdad, demanding Faisal II’s abdication and the abolishment of the Hashemite monarchy in the country. In the wake of the ‘revolution’, Faisal fled with his family to Basrah, seeking to rally support from other Middle Eastern countries and the West to restore him to his throne, despite his visible unpopularity among much of the Iraqi population. At meetings in London, British and American diplomats came to a general consensus that, should the monarchy in Iraq fall, a void would be left for unchecked influence from both the UAF and the Soviet Union to fill, generating an inherent threat to stability in the region and the interests of either power. These fears were exacerbated when several high-ranking politicians and generals allied to the revolution declared their support for the UAF, an act viewed in the eyes of many in the West as tantamount to declaring support for Arab Socialism and the USSR. By the end of July, American economic support was being sent to both Faisal and his small detachment of loyal troops, as well as to Saudi Arabia, a nation which seemed poised to enter into any conflict on Faisal’s side. At Faisal’s request, both the United States and the United Kingdom sent military advisers and equipment to his forces, as well as supporting a large recruitment drive in southern Iraq to bolster the loyalist troops (though, wary of his reputation as a ‘western puppet’, Faisal stopped short of requesting American or British troops to become directly involved). The stage seemed set for civil war in Iraq, an event with the potential to create a new front for the Cold War.

Iraq’s civil war was to last for years to come, as Faisal’s forces, with considerable support especially from Saudi Arabia, seeing initial successes in pushing up the Euphrates and Tigris rivers towards Baghdad. The UAF too had found itself involved in the conflict, as it sent troop detachments to the Revolutionary forces based out of Baghdad, though this was to have a taxing effect on the internal stability of the Union, as its troops suffered high casualty rates and saw little success between 1965 and 1968. Increased political and economic support from the Soviet Union for the Revolutionaries, as well as the development of a deadly stalemate south of Baghdad by early 1965, led to the increase in the prominence of leftist factions in the Revolutionary army as its rhetoric shifted towards a broader anti-monarchical and anti-western stance. As Fuad al-Rikabi, a self-declared socialist, came to lead the forces of the revolution that same year, it appeared to many that the conflict had turned into a direct fight against socialism on the part of the western powers. The withdrawal of much of the United States’ economic support in late 1968 in response to the continued stalemate was a severe blow to the integrity of Faisal’s war effort. In the next three years, his forces would be gradually driven back to the sea, until, in January 1971, Faisal fled following the capture of Basrah and the capitulation of most of his forces. The fall of Basrah brought and end to the six year-long devastating Iraqi civil war, and though it ended in victory for the Revolutionaries and socialists, its effects were heavily detrimental to the neighbouring UAF, which had poured millions of dollars and thousands of troops into the conflict.

The UAF’s blunder in Iraq, which generated considerable domestic grievances, combined with the resignation of Khaled Mohieddin after what has been described as an ‘internal party coup’, left the Union’s future uncertain. Finally, after growing public discontent with the current political arrangement in the UAF, particularly in Syria where, despite efforts to prevent it, many felt there was undeniable Egyptian domination over the internal workings of the Union, the Presidents of Egypt and Syria signed the ‘July Reforms’ of 1971, which formally dissolved the UAF in favour of a return to a simple economic and military alliance, renamed the Association of Arab Republics. With the end of an attempted venture in realising pan-Arabism, Egypt and Syria would gradually drift further apart in their foreign and domestic policies, though Egypt, at least for a time, would continue to pursue a goal of advancing the cause of Arab-nationalism, notably in its intervention in South Yemen from 1971 onwards.